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FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION
Jean Braucher*
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), created by the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
went live on July 21, 2011. Less than three months later, the CFPB
published its Supervision and Examination Handbook, which outlines,
among other topics, how the bureau is using its new authority to regulate
abusive practices as well as unfair and deceptive ones. This Article
examines the theory underlying the new agency’s anti-abuse regulatory
power and its early implementation efforts. Armed with insights from
behavioral economics supported by extensive research, the CFPB is
targeting credit products designed to exploit consumer error. This new
approach, based mostly on the substance of deals rather than disclosure, is
arguably the most exciting development in consumer protection since the
advent of the modern consumer movement in the 1960s. Some states can be
expected to follow the federal lead and incorporate “abusive practices” into
their laws, creating UDAAP powers (for unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts
and practices) that support and extend those of the CFPB.
* * *

INTRODUCTION
Bad consumer deals, often structured using complicated and nasty
terms buried in long forms, are an old problem, and the law has long
struggled to find adequate tools to deal with them.1 Thus, it comes as good
news that the fledgling Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is
honing a brand new tool handed to it by Congress: the concept of abusive
practices.2 Using insights from behavioral economics, the CFPB is paying
close attention to the substance of consumer financial products—that is, to
whether consumers are being exploited.3 The new anti-abuse authority
* Roger C. Henderson Professor of Law, University of Arizona. Thanks to Ted Janger for
encouraging me to write this piece and to John Pottow for comments on an earlier version.
1. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION—DECIDING APPEALS 362–66
(1960) (discussing the struggles of courts and legal scholars to deal with the problem of
overreaching in standard form contracts).
2. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 1031(a), (d), 124 Stat. 1376, 2005, 2006 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5531) (authorizing the CFPB to regulate abusive practices, along with unfair and deceptive
ones).
3. The nature of the theory being used by CFPB is explored in Parts II and III below.
Although my title echoes Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976), that classic article dealt with dualities in legal thought such as rules
versus standards and individualism versus a sense of community. My reference to form and
substance may owe more to Arthur Leff’s exposition of the dimensions of unconscionability as
involving both form, in the sense of the procedure by which a contract is made, and substance, in
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shows promise, particularly because the CFPB has incorporated this
authority into its examination standards, which can be used to pressure
financial institutions to stop employing exploitative practices and to identify
practices to target in its enforcement actions.4
We have long known that consumer assent to standard form terms is
typically fictional and that common law concepts such as unconscionability,
involving “case-to-case sniping” as Arthur Leff put it, do not amount to an
effective technique for controlling the quality of mass contracts when the
market fails.5 The consumer movement of the 1960s brought a flowering of
administrative consumer protection at the state and federal levels. However,
disclosure regulation became its most common, yet insufficient, technique,
as exemplified by the alphabet soup of regulations written and enforced by
the Federal Reserve Board.6 Truth in Lending regulation was the most
intricately disappointing example.7
the sense of whether the deal is too one-sided or too harsh on the weaker party. See generally
Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 485 (1967). Of course, Kennedy’s emphasis on the importance of substantive justice and
community is reflected in the abiding popularity of consumer protection. See Press Release, Ctr.
for Responsible Lending, New Poll Shows Broad Support for Financial Reform: 77% of
Americans
Want
Tougher
Rules
for
Wall
Street
(July
19,
2011),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/media-center/press-releases/archives/New-Poll-Demonstrates
-Broad-Support-for-Financial-Reform.html (reporting that in a nationwide survey of likely voters,
93 percent want clearer explanations of credit rates and fees, 77 percent want it to be harder for
lenders to offer loans with risky or confusing features, and 74 percent want a single consumer
financial protection agency).
4. See CFPB, SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL (Oct. 2011),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/wp-content/themes/cfpb_theme/images/supervision
_examination_manual_11211.pdf [hereinafter EXAMINATION HANDBOOK 2011]; see also infra
note 122 (discussing how the agency links examination to enforcement).
5. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd—Consumers and the Common Law
Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 358 (1970) (arguing that the biggest problem with
unconscionability is the ineffectiveness of case-by-case litigation to address mass problems in
mass contracts, and arguing that administrative regulation is more effective). Tort law theories,
such as fraud or misrepresentation, involve a similar problem of dependence on case-by-case
inquiry into the facts of individual interactions, and, lately, some courts have invented the idea
that an “economic loss rule” bars use of fraud, or even consumer protection theories, if the parties
had a contract. See Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss and Mass-Market Customers:
Consumer Protection Statutes as Persuasive Authority in the Common Law of Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 829, 835–39 (2006) (noting that fraud and consumer protection are quintessentially about
economic loss, almost always in a contractual context, and that the idea of barring tort or statutory
recovery in contracts, especially consumer contracts, is based on a mistake in reading dicta of the
U.S. Supreme Court in the 1980s).
6. Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, see Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(a), (d), 124 Stat. at 2005, 2006
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531), and the creation of the CFPB, the Federal Reserve Board had
primary responsibility for administering consumer protection regulation of financial institutions,
and it promulgated numerous regulations to do so. See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN,
CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW, ch. 5, § 15:2 (West 2011).
7. Truth In Lending Act (TILA), Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (current version at
Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601–1667f (1968)). See generally
Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-In-Lending Act, 80
GEO. L.J. 233 (1991) (discussing the thinking that led to TILA and its limitations); Christopher L.
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The common law and administrative regulation have too often taken the
unthreatening approach of primarily focusing on the form rather than the
substance of bad deals, leaving drafters to recur to the attack.8 The CFPB is
taking over a vast amount of disclosure regulation,9 and this burden should
not distract the CFPB from its very important new substantive tools.10
Two core policy arguments were used to justify creating the CFPB. One
was the need for a consolidated and independent rule-making and
enforcement agency with consumer financial protection as its only task to
avoid both conflict among multiple banking regulators as well as the
internal conflict of having an agency primarily responsible for regulating
the safety and soundness of financial institutions also in charge of consumer
protection; as finally structured, CFPB is a bureau within the Federal
Reserve Board with financial independence, although not complete
independence because its regulations can be set aside by the Financial
Stability Oversight Council of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.11
Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the
Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 880–85, 900–01 (2003) (discussing both the
nonthreatening nature of disclosure regulation to free market ideology and also the point that
TILA is easily evaded by the use of fees that do not have to be stated in the finance charge or
annual percentage rate); Dee Pridgen, Putting Some Teeth in TILA: From Disclosure to
Substantive Regulation in the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2010, 24 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 615, 616–21 (2012) (discussing early recognition that complexity thwarted
the effectiveness of TILA, but also noting the lack of sufficient correction by regulators, who only
renewed their tinkering with disclosures).
8. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 364 (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L.
REV. 700, 702–03 (1939)) (stating that the difficulty with many techniques for dealing with
troublesome form clauses, such as construing clauses contrary to their patent meaning, is that
since they “rest on the admission that the clauses in question are permissible in purpose and
content, they invite the draftsman to recur to the attack. Give him time, and he will make the
grade.”).
9. The Dodd-Frank Act moved authority over most existing federal consumer financial
disclosure regulations to the CFPB. Dodd Frank Act § 1031(a), (d), 124 Stat. at 2005, 2006
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531). An example of how burdensome designing disclosures can be is
the eighteen-month-long process of coming up with mortgage application and closing forms, a
process that began in December 2010 and resulted in release of proposed new disclosures on July
9, 2012. See Integrated Mortgage Disclosures under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(Regulation X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 77 Fed. Reg. 51116 (August 23,
2012); see also Jeff Sovern, Op-Ed, Help for the Perplexed Home Buyer, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/opinion/a-guide-for-the-new-mortgage-form.html
(discussing the long process of drafting and testing the new disclosures but arguing that many
consumers will need mortgage counselors to understand the home loans they are offered). For a
prescient analysis of the inadequacy of disclosure regulation to deal with predatory subprime
mortgages, one made before the bubble burst, see Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the
Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 831 (2006)
(concluding that “[t]he current information-based legal paradigm confuses disclosure with
knowledge, understanding, and rational choice”).
10. See Pridgen, supra note 7, at 627–28 (listing the new substantive regulation of residential
mortgages included in the Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(a), (d), 124 Stat. at 2005, 2006 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5531) that the CFPB will oversee).
11. See Pridgen, supra note 7, at 625 (discussing the desire for a “non-captive government
agency” with a primary mission to protect consumers). See also, Dee Pridgen, Sea Changes in
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Although the first policy argument, about the need for a structurally strong
consumer financial protection agency, is an important one, the type of
regulation a consumer protection agency pursues is equally important. Even
dedicated and relentless disclosure regulation can only do so much—it is a
good first line of defense, but far from sufficient.12 Attention to substance is
also key.
The second policy argument for the CFPB, the focus of this article,
emphasized the type of regulation needed and stressed that consumer
financial products should be free from “tricks and traps.”13 This rhetoric
was politically smart because it did not sound like anything daring, perhaps
calling only for better disclosure to prevent trickery. However, it would
have been disappointing indeed if the CFPB had turned out to be nothing
more than a consolidated agency to oversee disclosure regulation. In
addition to the emphasis on eliminating tricks and traps, however, a related
rhetorical move used to advocate for creating the CFPB compared financial
products to toasters and other physical products and argued that both types
of products should be safe.14 This argument focused more clearly on the
need for substantive consumer protection. Early CFPB implementation
efforts suggest that these arguments, against tricks and traps and for
financial product safety, are two sides of one coin. The CFPB appears
focused on eliminating financial products that are based on tricks and traps,
that is, on working to do away with substantively bad, unsafe deals. Also,
the CFPB is armed with a newly sophisticated theory of what it should be
doing, as will be explained below in Parts II and III. Thus, the agency is
poised to make exciting advances in consumer protection.
In Part I, this Article begins by reviewing theoretical approaches used
over the course of several millennia to deal with bad consumer deals.
Consumer Financial Protection: Stronger Agency and Stronger Laws, 13 WYO. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (at Part II) (discussing restructuring of consumer financial protection to make
for a stronger, although not completely independent, agency and also the centralization of
consumer financial protection in the CFPB, rather than having consumer protection authority
spread among numerous banking regulators), supra note 9, and infra note 109 concerning
consolidation of consumer financial protection in the CFPB.
12. The obvious point that disclosure is insufficient as consumer protection is sometimes used
as the basis for the arguments that we should do away with disclosure or that we should not worry
if disclosure is delayed until it is too late to do any good; this is certainly not my position. See Jean
Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and Deceptive Practice, 46
WAYNE L. REV. 1805, 1809–18 (2000) (discussing the importance of both early disclosure and
substantive regulation). However, it would have been a waste of political capital to have a
protracted fight such as that over the Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(a), (d), 124 Stat. at 2005, 2006
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531), and end up with nothing more in the way of consumer protection
than a new agency to house disclosure regulation.
13. See Elizabeth Warren on Credit Card “Tricks and Traps,” PBS NOW (Jan. 2, 2009),
http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/501/credit-traps.html.
14. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 98 (2008)
(underscoring the nature of the approach as focused on substance with a different name for the
proposed agency, the Financial Product Safety Commission); see also infra notes 15 and 90–95
and accompanying text (discussing the product safety analogy).
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Policing of the marketplace was substantive for a long time, and disclosure
regulation was a twentieth century innovation. Part II traces the scholarly
development of the theory underlying the CFPB’s regulation of abusive
practices, a theory that refocuses consumer protection on substance. In Part
III, the Article describes and evaluates the CFPB’s initial mobilization of its
anti-abuse authority. It concludes that anti-abuse regulation based on
behavioral economics promises to be an important development, arguably
the most significant innovation in consumer law in decades.15
I. THE RISE AND EVENTUAL DOMINANCE OF DISCLOSURE
The earliest consumer financial protection was substantive—prohibiting
usury.16 In the ancient world, lending at interest, particularly if at high rates
for purposes of consumption, was often considered immoral.17 Interest was
either prohibited or rates were capped at modest levels, although evasion of
the law was also common.18 Early and medieval Christianity condemned the
charging of any interest, and usury became a sin punishable by
excommunication, but various fictions effectively permitted charging
interest or fees for some loans.19 The practical Protestants loosened the law
of usury to permit interest that was not “biting” and facilitated trade.20 With
the rise of the Enlightenment and modern economic thinking, abolition of
usury laws was the result in England.21 Usury law lingered much longer in
the United States, particularly in the Bible Belt of the South, but a U.S.
Supreme Court decision in 1978 prompted its effective abolition over the
15. In addition to regulation of consumer credit in the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601–1700, and in other laws, the consumer movement of the 1960s focused on physical
product quality regulation, eventually producing both product safety and warranty initiatives in the
1970s. Like TILA, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty and Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312, was too complicated and relied too heavily on disclosure.
The consumer movement scored better on regulation of product safety, resulting in the creation, in
1972, of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–2073
(creating the agency and outlining its powers). CPSC is the inspiration for CFPB, but the latter
also owes much to observation of the failings of the long experiment with disclosure as the
primary means to regulate credit products.
16. James M. Ackerman, Interest Rates and the Law: A History of Usury, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
61, 64 (1981).
17. Id. at 63–71 (recounting moral views about lending at interest as well as legal constraints
on interest rates applicable in various cultures, including Hebrew, Sumerian, Babylonian, Greek,
and Roman).
18. See id.
19. See generally id. at 72–77 (discussing the seriousness with which usury was treated and
also describing numerous structures used to evade the prohibition, such as use of silent
partnerships or sale of “annuities,” inflated currency exchange rates, and late payment charges).
20. See generally id. at 77–79 (recounting developments during the Reformation and Calvin’s
interpretation that “the Bible prohibits only ‘biting’ interest that oppresses the poor,” permitting
moderate interest that facilitated trade).
21. See generally id. at 82–85 (discussing the writing of John Locke and Jeremy Bentham,
especially the latter’s 1787 Letters in Defense of Usury, and the repeal in 1854 in England of all
acts against usury).
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next few years, clearing the way for an explosive growth in high cost and
high risk consumer credit.22
As a companion to strict usury prohibitions that kept a lid on risky
consumer credit, the medieval approach to regulation of markets for goods
and services used authoritarian control of fairness and involved enforced
communal solidarity against all manner of cheats.23 Local and special courts
and inspectors exercised paternal solicitude in many ways, for example, in
the assizes of bread and beer, in oversight of notions of gallons and quarts,
in proper content of sausages (no pieces of drowned cow allowed), in sizes
of bricks, and even in policing to see that porters did not stop to play cards
and backgammon.24 In a foreshadowing of the problem of tricks and traps in
complicated financial products, authorities looked for physical traps used
by scamming bakers:
A number of bakers were hailed into court for contriving holes in their
counters, artfully concealed by ingenious trapdoors, through which their
customers’ dough was stolen before their very eyes. The makers knew
their wares; their customers, who were inexpert, did not. The law was
invoked lest there be deceit of many people having no knowledge of the
same.25

Caveat emptor was an occasional, mostly late, and contested idea, with
the law of warranty and deceit contradicting the philosophical pull of
laissez-faire, which had perhaps its fullest flowering in nineteenth-century
America.26 In a restless and far-flung population with little recourse to
magistrates, the law in action left consumers mostly to protect themselves if
they could.
Even as the common law of contract became more formal and deemphasized substantive fairness, equity pulled the other way. This tension
produced the doctrine of unconscionability, which became a settled part of

22. See James J. White, The Usury Trompe L’Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445, 450–54 (2000)
(discussing how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the National Bank Act of 1863 in
Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978), led to federal and state
legislative changes that effectively ended usury regulation except in isolated local pockets).
Notably, the Dodd-Frank Act, § 1027(o), 124 Stat. 1376, 1995 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5517(o)),
bars the CFPB from imposing usury limits, but with the implication that other substantive
regulation is permissible. See infra note 125 and accompanying text discussing this point.
23. William H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1136
(1931) (referring ironically in the title to the “ancient maxim,” and explaining, “Caveat emptor is
not to be found among the reputable ideas of the Middle Ages. As custom of trade or rule of law it
is not to be met with upon the highways of mediaeval culture. To priest and lord, to yeoman and
villain, and even to burglar and lawyer, it would have fallen strangely upon the ear. They did not
talk that language.”).
24. Id. at 1142–46.
25. Id. at 1151–52 (footnotes omitted).
26. Id. at 1171–75, 1178–81.
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the federal common law by the late nineteenth century.27 When the doctrine
was included in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, it was not
defined other than in a rambling and somewhat contradictory comment.28
The case law developed the idea that both form (also referred to as
“procedure,” in the sense of the process by which a contract was entered
into) and substance mattered.29 Application of the flexible doctrine has, of
course, varied. The case law in some places has developed a “sliding scale”
approach to unconscionability, requiring less of one type of unfairness
where there is more of the other kind.30 One state’s highest court has noted
the lack of any mention of procedure in the language of section 2-302 itself
and concluded that unconscionability can be found on the basis of
substantive unfairness alone, an approach followed by a sprinkling of other
courts.31
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts also recognized
unconscionability.32 In addition, it included an innovative doctrine, derived
from a scholarly analysis by Karl Llewellyn, concerning unenforceability of
standard-form terms contrary to reasonable expectations.33 While the black
letter of the Restatement’s section 211(3) could be read narrowly, the
American Law Institute (ALI) restatements are not statutes; as to this
provision, a comment makes clear that the ALI endorses a broad concept
that parties to standard form contracts “are not bound to unknown terms
which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation.”34 The black letter
test—which is whether there was “reason to believe the adhering party
27. Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 236–37 (1892) (refusing specific enforcement
of an unconscionable contract in a case involving diversity of citizenship of the parties); Hume v.
United States, 132 U.S. 406, 415 (1889) (refusing to enforce a contract with an unconscionable
price charged to a federal agency); see also 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 703 (2d ed.
1993) (discussing lack of enforcement in equity of unconscionable contracts).
28. UNIF.COMMERCIALCODE § 2-302, cmt. 1 (including the idea that clauses in contracts
should not be “so one-sided as to be unconscionable” and that this should be judged “under the
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract,” and also that “[t]he principle is
one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise” and “not of disturbance of allocation of
risks because of superior bargaining power”; the focus on one-sidedness and oppression suggests a
substantive test, while the focus on the circumstances at the time of making and on unfair surprise
suggests a procedural test).
29. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449–50 (D.C. Cir.
1965); see also Leff, supra note 3, at 486–88.
30. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc. 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (“[T]he
more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability
is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.”).
31. Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995) (“[E]vidence that the dual
requirement position is more coincidental than doctrinal is found within the very text of the statute
on unconscionability, which explicitly refers to ‘the contract or any clause of the contract.’ . . .
Conspicuously absent from the statutory language is any reference to procedural aspects.”); see
also, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (App. Div. 1998).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
33. Id. § 211(3). See infra notes 37–46 and accompanying text concerning the origins of this
doctrine in the work of Llewellyn.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211, cmt. f. (1981).
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would not have accepted the agreement if he had known that the agreement
contained the particular term”—is expanded by the comment, which states
that “reason to believe” can be filled in by inference:
Reason to believe may be inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre or
oppressive, from the fact that it eviscerates the non-standard terms
explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it eliminates the dominant
purpose of the transaction. The inference is reinforced if the adhering
party never had an opportunity to read the term, or if it is illegible or
otherwise hidden from view. This rule is closely related to the policy
against unconscionable terms . . . .35

While the reasonable expectations doctrine has a primarily substantive
thrust, it also embodies an idea of extraordinarily effective disclosure as a
means to avoid creating expectations; for example, a party with knowledge
of a harsh term can hardly claim that it was contrary to his or her reasonable
expectations.36 As we shall see, this is why the concept of “abusive
practices” is so important: parties can know of a term but not appreciate
how it will affect them. Trickery need not involve nondisclosure or even
buried disclosure; rather, it can be based on exploiting another’s lack of
understanding of what has been clearly disclosed as well as consumer
errors, such as underestimation of future credit use.
The origins of the reasonable expectations doctrine are in the
jurisprudential work of Llewellyn, who recognized that standard form
contracts present a challenge to a contract theory grounded in mutual
assent.37 He took on the difficult question of how we can see an adhering
party as agreeing, even objectively, to form terms that the drafter knows the
adhering party did not read or otherwise know about. Llewellyn’s
theoretical solution was what he called “blanket assent,” as distinguished
from specific assent to “the few dickered terms, and the broad transaction
type.”38 Blanket assent, he argued, is given
to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his form.
. . . The fine print which has not been read has no business to cut under the

35. Id.; see also Braucher, supra note 12, at 1814–18 (discussing Karl Llewellyn’s concept of
blanket assent, discussed infra at notes 37–46 and accompanying text, and the Restatement’s
reasonable expectations doctrine as involving more substantive policing than mixed procedureand-substance unconscionability).
36. It is interesting that in Arizona, which has a robust general doctrine of reasonable
expectations not limited to the insurance context, unconscionability is treated as a theory that can
be used on the basis of substantive unfairness alone, see supra note 31, while the reasonable
expectations doctrine is treated as a mixed matter of substance and process. See Jean Braucher,
Cowboy Contracts: The Arizona Supreme Court’s Grand Tradition of Transaction Fairness, 50
ARIZ. L. REV. 191, 213–21 (discussing how the Arizona court defined reasonable expectations and
unconscionability).
37. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 362 (discussing the problem of form “Agreement” with the
scare quotes in the heading of the original).
38. Id. at 370.
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reasonable meaning of those dickered terms which constitute the dominant
and only real expression of agreement, but much of it commonly belongs
in.39

If one focuses on Llewellyn’s support for throwing out unreasonable
terms, one may miss the real thrust of this passage: that, in his view, most
of what is in a form should be enforced. But why? Is it really about assent?
The answer, explained earlier in the same section of Llewellyn’s book, The
Common Law Tradition, is decidedly in the negative. Instead, one finds a
paean to business efficiency, with the emphasis on the convenience of the
business drafting the form, not on the adhering party’s assent:
The impetus to the form-pad is clear, for any business unit: by
standardizing terms, and by standardizing even the spot on the form where
any individually dickered term appears, one saves all the time and skill
otherwise needed to dig out and record the meaning of variant language;
one makes check-up, totaling, follow-through, etc., into routine
operations; one has duplicates (in many colors) available for the
administration of a multidepartment business; and so on more.40

Llewellyn was deeply sympathetic to businesses’ desire for flexibility
to create their own certainty. He romantically believed that businesses
would, on the whole, refrain from acting unreasonably or indecently, so that
a light hand of constraint would be sufficient. He was even willing to
concede that he was picturing not agreement but “private government in the
lesser transactions of life.”41 To serve business efficiency, he built his
“blanket assent” theory. So here is the kicker: blanket assent is a fiction,
albeit a convenient one, and is not about any real assent of the adhering
party but is rather about the perceived needs of the business doing the
drafting.42 In other words, our best explanation of standard forms as
contractual, as about agreement—by the leading American legal realist no
less—is constructed around fictional assent.
Of course, Llewellyn recognized the need for remedies against
unreasonable forms. He said the problem was real, sometimes amounting to
“flagrant trickery,”43 but he also hoped that judicial policing would largely
be sufficient, while acknowledging that perhaps it would not be.
Concluding his hymn of praise for standard forms as a means to save time
and skill, he wrote, “It would be a heart-warming scene, a triumph of
private attention to what is essentially private self-government in the lesser
transactions of life or in those areas too specialized for the blunt, slow tools
of the legislature—if only all businessmen and all their lawyers would be
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id. at 362–63.
Id. at 363.
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reasonable.”44 He referred also to “gentlemanly restraint” as well as fully
negotiated trade rules as solutions.45
Thus, there is an even bigger problem with Llewellyn’s theory of
standard form contracts than its core fiction of “blanket assent.” It is also an
unrealistic way to think about business norms in the face of intense market
competition; more than weak judicial policing is needed if we want
businesses to be able to act decently. It should be noted that Llewellyn was
mostly focused on contracts between two businesses; he was not
expounding a theory of consumer contracts in particular.46 Without deep
investigation, it is hard to say whether businesses were more reasonable and
decent in their standard form deals when Llewellyn wrote in the midtwentieth century than they are today. Llewellyn may have been naïve, as
well as romantic, about business culture even then. But, carrying his theory
forward to today clearly makes no sense in many realms, particularly that of
consumer finance, which has one of the most ruthless industry cultures of
all, a product of stiff competition to attract investors seeking the highest
possible returns.47 We cannot expect credit card issuers to act with
gentlemanly restraint; competitive conditions have driven them to create a
business model that has been described as a debt “sweatbox.”48
The common law has proved incapable of doing better than developing
doctrines of unconscionability and reasonable expectations as ways to
police bad standard form deals. Furthermore, common law methodology, no
matter the details of the doctrine, is unequal to the task of policing lender
exploitation of consumers.
44. Id. at 362.
45. Id. at 363.
46. Llewellyn mostly used business-to-business examples, but lumped in a few consumer
examples too, such as apartment leases and installment sales of appliances; but, in his consumer
examples, Llewellyn also referred to the fact that legislative intervention was underway. Id. at
362, 366. Llewellyn had earlier written specifically about consumer protection as an enormous
problem beyond the capacity of common law methodology, and thus one that called for the
incisive diagnosis and efficient treatment that a statute can provide. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 67–68 (1989). For why this is referred to as “earlier” writing, see
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA ix–x (1989), explaining that the
original edition of this book was published in German in 1933 based on lectures given in 1928–
1929.
47. Jean Braucher, Theories of Overindebtedness: Interaction of Structure and Culture, 7
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 323, 334–36 (2006) (discussing the hard-edged nature of the culture
of the consumer credit industry, in which competition forces lenders to go to the limits of what the
law allows).
48. Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REV. 375, 384–92 (2007) (describing how credit card issuers make the most money on
borrowers who become distressed and pay high interest on their balances for a period of time,
even if they eventually default); see infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (discussing further
the predatory nature of the sweatbox business model). See also Jean Braucher, The Sacred and
Profane Contracts Machine: The Complex Morality of Contract Law in Action, 45 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 667, 684–88 (discussing moral ideas in business and how competition can force business
persons to act amorally, so that regulation is needed to permit them to act decently).
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The consumer movement produced administrative regulation, much of
it involving disclosure.49 Lately, there has also been a turn to specific
substantive requirements, such as in the Card Act50 and in recent mortgage
regulation.51 While this is promising because businesses tend to avoid
violating explicit commands,52 more flexible approaches are also needed to
address the creativity of consumer creditors in coming up with new ways to
trap hapless borrowers. This problem demands regulation that can nip in the
bud innovations in exploitation. For this part of the task, administratively
policed general standards are needed.
Open-textured and potentially anticipatory consumer protection
regulation has long been the province of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), with its mission to police unfair and deceptive practices.53 The FTC
has defined each of these concepts as best as it could, particularly given the
pressures of industry-influenced congressional oversight.54 As will be
discussed in Part III of this Article, both deception and unfairness can have
elements of nondisclosure, but unfairness in particular goes somewhat
beyond an approach focused on form. Unfortunately, the FTC never had
authority to police directly the deception and unfairness practiced by
financial institutions.55 The Dodd-Frank Act has solved this problem by

49. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text; see also MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD,
CONSUMER LAW: A GUIDE FOR THOSE WHO REPRESENT SELLERS, LENDERS, AND CONSUMERS
228–30 (Little, Brown and Co. 1995) (discussing history of disclosure regulation and its full
flowering with administrative implementation of the Truth in Lending Act of 1968).
50. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11124, 124 Stat. 1743 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see ADAM J. LEVITIN, THE
CREDIT C.A.R.D. ACT: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR CREDIT UNIONS 1–2 (Filene
Research Institute, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1544885 (describing most
significant provisions of the law as involving limits on changes in terms and on fees that can be
charged).
51. Pridgen, supra note 7, at 627–35; see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
52. William C. Whitford, Structuring Consumer Protection Legislation to Maximize
Effectiveness, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1018, 1022 (1981) (noting the tendency of merchants to do what
they are specifically directed by statute to do out of “belief in law-abidingness and fear of bad
publicity,” and also discussing generally the mostly symbolic effect of vague, admonitory
legislation that depends on private rights of actions for enforcement).
53. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (codified as amended 2006)
(including, in particular, § 45, which addresses unfair or deceptive acts and practices).
54. Unfairness is now defined in 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4), which codifies an FTC policy statement
made in Letter to Senators Ford & Danforth, Consumer Subcommittee, Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in In re Int’l Harvester, 104 F.T.C. 949,
1070 (1984) [hereinafter FTC Unfairness Policy Statement]; see also Jean Braucher, Defining
Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. REV.
349, 405–12 (1988) (discussing the political pressures that led to the Unfairness Policy Statement
and discussing its analysis). Deception is defined in the FTC’s Policy Statement on Deception,
Letter to John D. Dingell, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee
on Energy and Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983), reprinted as applied to In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103
F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984) [hereinafter FTC Deception Policy Statement].
55. See generally Julie L. Williams & William S. Bylsma, On the Same Page: Federal
Banking Agency Enforcement of the FTC Act to Address Unfair and Deceptive Practices by
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giving the CFPB authority to address unfair and deceptive acts and
practices of financial institutions and, for good measure, Dodd-Frank added
abusive practices, too.56 Now, one agency has power to require disclosure
under the Truth in Lending Act and to regulate unfair, deceptive, and
abusive practices. The regulatory mission is not merely disclosure, but
consumer protection, broadly and flexibly defined.57
This broad definition of mission is needed more now than ever. Indeed,
as will be described in the next section, the consumer credit industry has
become driven by a science of studying and exploiting patterns of consumer
error. In the fight against over-indebtedness, we need regulation of the
credit industry to reduce this sort of lending.58 This is where the CFPB’s
new authority to regulate abusive practices comes in, but first it will be
helpful to understand the theory behind the CFBP’s anti-abuse power.
II. THE THEORY OF ABUSIVENESS AND ITS SUBSTANTIVE
FOCUS
A rich body of theoretical and empirical work supports the need for
regulation of abusive extensions of credit. The idea that lenders should not
abuse borrowers by extending overly risky credit can be traced back at least
to the advocacy of Vern Countryman in the 1960s, when he chaired a
committee of the National Bankruptcy Conference (NBC) formed to
propose improvements in the wage earner plan under Chapter XIII of the
Bankruptcy Act, the predecessor of today’s Chapter 13 repayment plan
form of bankruptcy.59 Countryman was concerned that consumer finance
companies were inducing debtors not to disclose their full indebtedness by
using forms that only provided space to list a few debts, sometimes
followed by a printed line saying “we have no other debts.”60 He saw this
practice as a trick designed to manufacture bankruptcy nondischargeability
due to a debtor’s use of a false financial statement to obtain credit.61 More

Banks, 58 BUS. LAW. 1243 (2003) (discussing various banking agencies’ use of their authority to
regulate unfair and deceptive practices).
56. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031(a), (d), 124 Stat. 1376, 2005, 2006 (2010)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).
57. See Rubin, supra note 7, at 283–84 (critiquing the legislative drive for TILA as based on a
premise that its goal was disclosure, with insufficient evaluation of whether disclosure would
achieve consumer protection).
58. Braucher, supra note 47, at 342–46 (discussing the structural and cultural dimensions of
both creditor and debtor behavior and arguing that the least promising way to address
overindebtedness is by efforts to change informally the culture of the consumer credit industry;
because the industry operates under competitive conditions, regulation affecting its structure is
more promising, although politically challenging).
59. Margaret Howard, Vern Countryman and Barry Zaretsky: A Legacy of Ideas, 75 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 283, 296 (2001); see also Vern Countryman, Improvident Credit Extension: A New
Legal Concept Aborning?, 27 ME. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1975).
60. Countryman, supra note 59, at 3.
61. Id. at 3–4.
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broadly and importantly, he was also concerned that creditors were not
checking credit reports maintained by credit bureaus to find out about total
indebtedness or were ignoring information creditors did collect.62 As a
result, he proposed two defenses to creditors’ claims in bankruptcy:
unconscionability and improvident extension of credit.63 Only
unconscionability made it into the 1966 NBC proposal,64 but Countryman
later wrote an article in which he expanded his analysis of creditor
improvidence.65
Countryman was concerned with a consumer credit business model
based on “volume rather than on thorough credit investigation.”66 This was
the essence of what he termed improvident extension of credit, which he
defined as extending credit “where it cannot reasonably be expected that the
debtor can repay the debt according to its terms” in view of “circumstances
of the debtor at the time the credit was extended . . . known to the creditor
or [that] would have been revealed to him on reasonable inquiry prior to the
credit extension.”67 The objects of his concern were “gullible or necessitous
debtors” who took on impossible debt burdens, as well as their “responsible
creditors.”68 While conceding that debtors are also responsible for taking
out loans they cannot afford, he packed an elaborate economic analysis, one
that behavioral economists have since documented, into one sentence:
“Although both the debtor and the offending creditor have been
improvident, typically the creditor is the better equipped—by education,
experience, resources, and the nature of his role—to avoid and distribute the
risk of improvidence.”69 Although he considered the desirability of a tort
claim, not just a contract defense, that could be asserted outside bankruptcy
to recover all losses brought on by resulting overindebtedness, Countryman
focused on creating a cause of action for improvidence in bankruptcy
because such a cause of action would provide a ready means of recovering
the losses and returning them to the estate for the benefit of all creditors.70
At the core of Countryman’s concept of improvident lending, then, is
the idea that a creditor has a responsibility to evaluate borrowers’ ability to
repay, so as to protect debtors as well as other creditors. The essence of
predatory lending is extending credit to those who can be expected to
default, and creditors who fail to evaluate creditworthiness know that they
are setting up some of their customers for a fall. Creditors can make money
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 8–10.
See generally id. (developing the idea that creditors should evaluate their debtors’ ability to
repay and advocating a bankruptcy remedy for improvident lending).
66. Id. at 2.
67. Id. at 23.
68. Id. at 9.
69. Id. at 17.
70. Id. at 20–21.
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on such credit in various ways—on volume, as Countryman noted, or
alternatively by having substantial collateral or, as we shall see, by charging
high interest for long enough that eventual default does not cause a loss.71
In the wake of a mortgage crisis brought on by “no doc” and “liar”
loans and similar subprime mortgage products offered with little or no
underwriting of the risk of default, the concept that lenders must evaluate
ability to pay has finally been explicitly embraced in federal consumer
financial protection law.72 Assessment of ability to pay became a
requirement for all mortgage originators under the Dodd-Frank Act.73 Also,
the Federal Reserve Board had earlier adopted this standard, effective
October 1, 2009, for most high-cost mortgage loans.74 Furthermore,
Congress directly required credit card issuers to determine ability to pay by
legislation in 2009.75 Thus, it is fair to say that Countryman has been
posthumously triumphant, as powerful ex ante statutory and administrative
regulation now goes far beyond his proposals for ex post tort and
bankruptcy remedies.
Countryman focused on the most obvious abusive practices of his day,
but what has happened since involves a whole new level of sophisticated
abuse by design. In an analysis predating the bursting of the housing bubble
fueled by predatory lending, John Pottow picked up on this change in credit
industry practices in an article published in 2007 that reacted to Congress’s
steps in the 2005 bankruptcy law to get tough on debtors.76 He argued that
if we really want to reduce bankruptcy, it would be more effective to get
tough on creditors, who are better positioned to reduce the bad credit that
causes it.77 He proposed reviving Countryman’s idea of improvident credit,
renaming it “reckless credit” to emphasize that more than negligence is
involved.78
Pottow based his calls for both a contract defense and a tort cause of
action for reckless credit on insights of behavioral economics and on
71. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
72. See generally John E. Pottow, Ability to Pay, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 175 (2011)
(discussing origins of the new regulations, their mechanics, and their normative justification). See
also KATHLEEN C. ENGLE & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT,
REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 35–38 (Oxford University Press, 2011) (discussing
loose underwriting and lack of documentation in the run-up to the mortgage crisis).
73. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1411, 124 Stat. 1376, 2142 (2010) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1639c).
74. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.31–226.39 (2010) (regulation Z, subpart E); see Jean Braucher, Humpty
Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the Lackluster First Year of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 727, 734–35, 734 n.28 (2010)
(concerning the belated adoption of this rule after the mortgage crisis).
75. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11124, § 109, 123 Stat. 1734, 1743 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
76. John E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
405, 406 (2007).
77. Id. at 406–07.
78. Id. at 428.
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research into the business model known as the “sweatbox” of consumer
credit.79 Behavioral economics analysis posits that creditors have
comparative advantages over debtors both in avoiding cognitive biases,
such as debtors’ underestimation of their future credit use and optimism
about their financial prospects in general, and in creditors’ superior access
to information to evaluate risk.80 Pottow’s analysis of the troublesome
business model focused on industry reliance on defaulters for profitability
by luring customers with low initial rates and then cranking up the heat on
“sweaters” by charging late payment fees and penalty rates, making a lot of
money on them before they eventually default.81
Pottow might be criticized for an almost quaint endorsement of the use
of the common law to regulate creditors; he even extolled case-by-case
policing in the mold of unconscionability.82 But this line of attack would be
to miss that Pottow stresses that his proposal is “complementary, not
exclusive.”83 His advocacy for complementary approaches suggests that we
may need, along with CFPB administrative oversight to prevent abuse,
something like a cause of action for reckless credit extension to provide
private rights of action, but perhaps implemented by state statutes rather
than common law. This could be done by amendment of the state statutes
addressing unfair and deceptive acts and practices (UDAPs)—sometimes
called “little FTC acts”—to add abusive acts and practices and cover all
three types of practices (hence, UDAAPs), so that in addition to CFPB
regulation, there would be state-level administrative enforcement and
statutory private rights of action with multiple damages and attorneys’
fees.84 Alternatively, even without statutory amendment, state consumer
protection agencies and courts could interpret the deliberately flexible
phrases “deceptive practices” and “unfair practices” to encompass
abusiveness as developed by CFPB, particularly in light of advances in our
research-based understanding of the mechanisms of consumer exploitation.
For his analysis of reckless credit, Pottow drew upon Oren Bar-Gill’s
work applying the insights of behavioral economics to explain credit card
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See Mann, supra note 48, at 384–92.
See Pottow, supra note 76, at 431–34.
Id. at 415–17.
Id. at 426–29, 434.
Id. at 435.
See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1041, 124 Stat. 1376, 2011–12 (2010)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5551) (making clear that Dodd-Frank establishes a federal floor and does
not preclude states from providing consistent additional protection, including greater consumer
protection); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority
to Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 922–25 (discussing Dodd-Frank’s
anti-preemption provision and the possibility that states could interpret their UDAP statutes to also
cover abusive practices and use CFPB authority as persuasive authority). On the other hand,
adding “abusive acts and practices” to a state’s UDAP statute could do this explicitly. See also
generally CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES (2008 &
2011 Supp.) (discussing both federal and state UDAP law and their interaction).
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pricing.85 In Seduction by Plastic, Bar-Gill examined the complex mix of
fees and rates used by card issuers, which included at the time of his
investigation “low introductory rates that appear alongside high long-term
interest rates, zero annual and per-transaction fees, large penalties for late
payments and for deviations from the credit limit, and low (and even
negative) amortization rates.”86 Bar-Gill argued that these pricing practices
reflected a studied exploitation of consumers’ underestimation of their own
likelihood of running a balance and other consumer errors, such as thinking
they would switch to a lower-rate card before the teaser rate ran out.87 He
noted that such complex pricing practices can be a telltale sign of
exploitation in consumer markets more generally, even beyond the realm of
credit products.88 While challenging a position favoring nonintervention,
Bar-Gill put off making a particular regulatory proposal and awaited the
opportunity for further analysis.89
Following the mortgage crisis, Bar-Gill and coauthor Elizabeth Warren
returned to the concerns of his earlier article and took on the prescriptive
task. They argued, in Making Credit Safer, for an administrative agency
with ex ante power to prevent consumer exploitation by lenders offering
unsafe credit products.90 This article is sometimes remembered for the use
of a toaster analogy, that is, the idea that consumer financial products
should have to be safe just as physical products must be. While the toaster
analogy is used in the introduction and elsewhere in Making Credit Safer,91
it originally comes from an earlier advocacy piece by Warren.92
More significantly, Making Credit Safer lays out a vast amount of
empirical support, taken from studies conducted by many researchers, for
the proposition that creditors have exploited consumer errors systematically
and designed traps to make consumers pay more than they expected.93 Bar-

85. See Pottow, supra note 76, at 418 & n.60 (citing Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98
NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004)). See also Pridgen, supra note 11, at pts. III.A, III.B (discussing
CFPB’s greater reliance on insights of behavioral economics and consequent de-emphasis of
disclosure regulation).
86. Bar-Gill, supra note 85, at 1374.
87. Id. at 1376.
88. Id. at 1379, 1428–34 (discussing how exploitation of consumer biases is not limited to the
credit card industry or even consumer credit).
89. Id. at 1378, 1411–27 (discussing reasons for intervention and possible means of doing so).
90. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 14, at 98 (making a proposal for such an agency).
91. Id. at 7 (noting that “[t]oday, consumers can enter the market to buy physical products,
confident that they will not be deceived into buying exploding toasters . . . . Consumers entering
the market to buy financial products should enjoy the same benefits.”).
92. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J., Summer 2007, at 8, available at
http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/5/Warren.pdf (opening with an analogy between a toaster
bursting into flames and a mortgage with a high risk of putting the family out on the street).
93. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 14, at Part I.B (setting forth evidence that markets for
consumer credit products are failing).
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Gill and Warren also examined why disclosure regulation will not work.94
Here, the toaster analogy is useful because no one thinks the primary and
best way to regulate against dangerous toasters is better disclosure about
their risks. Also, despite their homey familiarity, toasters are surprisingly
complex—most of us will never understand exactly how they work—but
we want and expect them to be safe.95
The rich description of pricing practices in Making Credit Safer draws
on examples involving credit cards, subprime mortgages, and payday loans.
Credit cards provide perhaps the most interesting example, because
practices were so different before and after the beginning of the Great
Recession as the industry adjusted to changing consumer preoccupations.
Credit card pricing used to focus on low teaser rates to get debtors into the
sweatbox.96 After the Great Recession, and the reduced consumer
confidence that followed, creditors adapted to consumers’ caution about
debt by emphasizing lower long-term rates while adding many extra
charges to which consumers did not pay attention.97
During the housing bubble, subprime mortgage lenders emphasized low
or zero down payments, with low interest for two or three years that then
reset to a high rate.98 Once again, creditors used low initial rates in the same
way cheese is used in a mousetrap. Many consumers failed to appreciate the
risk and also failed to refinance when they could, so that they were caught
by falling home values when the housing market snapped.99 Another form
of consumer error, a particularly gross one, was common—taking out a
subprime loan when the borrower could have qualified for a prime one.100
94. Id. at Part I.A (concerning the limits of consumer learning); see also Lauren E. Willis,
Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, pt. II (2008) (pointing out that
advocates of financial literacy education lack empirical support that this type of education works
to change behavior, and questioning the plausibility of its premises given the gap between the
skills needed to understand complex financial products and the general educational attainment of
much of the U.S. population as well as evidence of consumer error in financial decision-making).
95. See generally THOMAS THWAITES, THE TOASTER PROJECT—OR A HEROIC ATTEMPT TO
BUILD A SIMPLE ELECTRIC APPLIANCE FROM SCRATCH (2011) (detailing the author’s attempt to
build a toaster from scratch by crafting and assembling more than 400 parts). See also Michael
Hanlon, Killers in your Kitchen: Gender-bending Packaging, Exploding Floor Cleaners and
Toasters More Deadly than Sharks, DAILYMAIL.COM (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.dailymail
.co.uk/femail/food/article-1245151/Killers-kitchen-Gender-bending-packaging-exploding-floorcleaners-toasters-deadly-sharks-.html (reporting that “[s]everal hundred people a year worldwide
are killed by their toasters, compared to eight or nine by sharks,” suggesting that toasters remain
appliances to handle with caution).
96. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 14, at 33–37 (discussing use of teaser rates, with consumers
making mistakes both in not switching before the introductory rate expired and in making
calculations about the benefits of the teaser as opposed to the long-term rate for their eventual use
patterns).
97. Id. at 46–52 (noting proliferating additional fees).
98. Id. at 53–54 (concerning low down payments and initial rates).
99. Id. (discussing failures to make optimal refinancing decisions).
100. Id. at 38–39 (concerning various surveys indicating that 35 to 50 percent of subprime
borrowers could have obtained prime mortgages).
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Errors in the use of payday loans are also common—including using highcost payday loans when liquid assets or cheaper credit products are
available and getting trapped by the fact that these loans do not typically
provide for installment repayment—resulting in multiple rollovers with a
new fee charged each time.101
With all three of these credit products, regulation by disclosure often
fails to work for an array of reasons. Complexity and variety prevent
transparency.102 Even when creditors try to explain complex features, they
cannot always get through to consumers.103 Constant changes in terms make
pricing opaque.104 Furthermore, segmentation of the market means that
savvy borrowers who shop for better terms do not police the market on
behalf of non-shoppers, so that creditors can market worse deals to the less
educated, the poor, and racial minorities.105 Disclosure also fails to work
because consumers mispredict their own future use of credit; creditors,
meanwhile, make a science of studying consumers and adapting to their
patterns, pricing low what consumers are currently paying attention to while
charging high prices for things consumers do not believe they will use but
which they later end up using.106
Based on their exploration of research into industry practices, Bar-Gill
and Warren argued that specific, frozen substantive regulation would not
work to address exploitation of consumer error; they advocated creation of
an agency that could respond quickly to market innovation in design of
credit products.107 In sum, Making Credit Safer provides the regulatory
analysis for why the CFPB is needed and a blueprint for what it should be
doing, particularly with its power over abusive lending practices.108
101. Id. at 44–45 and 55–56 (discussing high rollover rates among payday loan customers and
accumulation of fees); see also Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A
Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 596–608 (2010) (discussing
empirical findings concerning consumers’ lack of understanding of payday loans and their
conduct in using them).
102. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 14, at 16 (noting that one issuer alone, Bank of America,
offered more than 400 credit card options).
103. Id. at 20 (concerning Citibank’s efforts to try to get credit card customers to understand the
benefits of not having universal default clauses or any-time interest rate changes).
104. Id. at 13 (discussing the cost of acquiring information when terms change frequently).
105. Id. at 7 (concerning customization of products to undercut the policing effect of an
informed minority); id. at 43 (concerning the better deals obtained by the college-educated); id. at
64–66 (concerning targeting the less educated, the poorer, and racial minorities to receive higherpriced products, even controlling for their risk factors); id. at 69 (noting that the wealthy are more
commonly insulated from exploitation).
106. Id. at 23 (discussing superior information access of creditors, who amass vast data and
make a science of analyzing it); id. at 79 (concerning constant market innovation).
107. Id. at 79, 84–85, 98 (discussing the problem that specific statutes do not lend themselves to
regulatory adaptation needed to avoid lagging far behind the market, and calling for an agency
that can respond quickly).
108. This is unsurprising, given that Elizabeth Warren, one of the two co-authors, was
responsible for standing up the CFPB as a White House advisor. See Elizabeth Warren, Standing
Up the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Oct. 28, 2010, 6:00
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III. CFPB ROLLS OUT ITS ANTI-ABUSE AUTHORITY
The Dodd-Frank Act gives the CFPB authority to regulate UDAAPs, an
acronym that requires a drawl to pronounce, but the agency has not been
slow to roll out its new anti-abuse authority in its Examination Handbook,
released in October 2011—less than three months after the agency went live
on July 21, 2011.109 The section giving the CFPB UDAAP powers picks up
concepts of unfair or deceptive acts or practices from the FTC Act and adds
abusive acts or practices to the list.110 For unfairness, the section uses the
same statutory definition as in the FTC Act.111 Deception is not defined in
either Dodd-Frank or the FTC Act, but the CFPB has defined it in the same
way as the FTC Deception Policy does.112
Unfairness, deception, and abusiveness are overlapping standards, but
the overlap does not matter much because any one of them is sufficient to
find a violation of the law.113 The three-part statutory test for unfairness is:
(1) substantial consumer injury (which can be by small injury to many
consumers), (2) that is not reasonably avoidable by consumers, and (3) that
is not outweighed by benefits to consumers or competition.114 The threepart administrative test of deception is: (1) a material (2) representation,
omission, act, or practice that misleads, or is likely to mislead, the
consumer, and (3) that the consumer’s misinterpretation is or would be
reasonable under the circumstances.115 The differences between unfairness
and deception are subtle, with the emphasis in unfairness on substantial
injury and whether the consumer can avoid it, and the emphasis in
deception on the likelihood of misleading. The CFPB has given examples

AM EDT), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/10/28/standing-consumer-financial-protection
-bureau; see also Edward J. Janger, Locating the Regulation of Data Privacy and Data Security, 5
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 97, 97–98 (2010) (crediting Bar-Gill and Warren with the idea of
creating the agency).
109. See EXAMINATION HANDBOOK 2011, supra note 4, at UDAAP 1–9. The “went live” date
for the CFPB is more formally known as “the designated transfer date”: the date when powers
from seven other agencies were transferred to the CFPB. In September 2010, the Treasury
Secretary set this date as July 21, 2011, the one-year anniversary of when the Dodd-Frank Act
became law. See Designated Transfer Date, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,252 (Sept. 20, 2010).
110. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2005 (2010) (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5531).
111. See Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4) (codified as amended
2006); Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(c), 124 Stat. at 2006 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531); see also supra
note 54 and accompanying text (discussing fact that the FTC Act definition of unfairness codified
the FTC Unfairness Policy Statement).
112. See EXAMINATION HANDBOOK 2011, supra note 4, at UDAAP 1–9; FTC Deception Policy
Statement, supra note 54.
113. Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(a), 124 Stat. at 2005 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531) (stating the
three standards in the disjunctive); see also EXAMINATION HANDBOOK 2011, supra note 4, at
UDAAP 9 (“abusive acts also may be unfair or deceptive”).
114. Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(c), 124 Stat. at 2005 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).
115. See EXAMINATION HANDBOOK 2011, supra note 4, at UDAAP 5 (citing the FTC
Deception Policy Statement, supra note 54).
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of each drawn from federal enforcement actions.116 The examples of
unfairness involve not releasing a lien after final payment on a mortgage,
dishonoring credit card convenience checks without notice, and processing
payments for companies engaged in fraudulent activities.117 The examples
of deception involve inadequate disclosure of material vehicle lease terms
in television advertising and misrepresentation of loan terms.118
As noted above, the Dodd-Frank Act also gives the CFPB authority to
regulate abusive acts or practices; in addition, Dodd-Frank defines
abusiveness by requiring that the act or practice:
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a
term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of—
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service;
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to
act in the interests of the consumer.119

The abusiveness test thus gives four disjunctive grounds for finding
abusiveness, making any one of them sufficient. In light of Bar-Gill and
Warren’s analysis,120 as well as the language about taking “unreasonable
advantage” of consumers’ “lack of understanding” of risks, costs, or
conditions of a financial product or service,121 the emphasis seems to be on
whether the creditor or other service provider is exploiting consumer error
rather than on mere nondisclosure. Disclosure does not seem to be good
enough if consumers still do not understand. Furthermore, supporting this
analysis, the CFPB has stressed that consumer complaints alleging lack of
understanding of the terms of a product or service may be “a red flag” for
examiners.122
The CFPB further fleshed out its understanding of its UDAAP powers
in a risk assessment template, which sets forth the basis by which it will

116.
117.
118.
119.

See EXAMINATION HANDBOOK 2011, supra note 4, at UDAAP 3, 7.
Id. at UDAAP 4.
Id. at UDAAP 7–8.
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 2006 (2010) (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5531).
120. See generally Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 14. See also supra notes 85–108 and
accompanying text (discussing the analysis of the article).
121. Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(d)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 2006 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).
122. See EXAMINATION HANDBOOK 2011, supra note 4, at UDAAP 9; see also id. at Overview
1, 3, 6 (quoting the Dodd-Frank Act § 1021(a), 124 Stat. at 1979–80 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5511)). The handbook ties supervision and examination to enforcement and also stresses that
CFPB is “data driven” and relies on data accumulated in examinations as well as other research.
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evaluate risk to consumers and ultimately decide whether to use its
enforcement powers.123 Particularly revealing is the first section of the
template concerning “Nature and Structure of Products,” which sets out the
following list of “factors that specifically increase the risk that unfair,
deceptive, abusive acts or practices, discrimination, or other violations of
Federal consumer financial law will occur”:
The profitability of a product is dependent upon penalty fees (e.g., fees for
a late payment, for exceeding a credit limit, or for overdrawing deposited
funds).
The terms of the product are subject to change at the discretion of the
entity, and the entity has frequently made changes in the terms.
The entity reverses fees at a significantly higher rate than other entities of
similar size offering similar products.
Pricing structure (interest rate, points, fees) and other features and terms
are combined in a manner that is likely to make the total costs of the
product difficult for consumers to understand.
Products are bundled in a way that may obscure relative costs.
Consumers pay penalties to terminate a relationship, including forgoing
money or benefits they would otherwise earn.
Consumers face barriers to information, such as costs to access customer
service or information about their account.
Credit decision-makers have wide discretion over setting terms and
features of products with inadequate policies and procedures addressing
appropriate exercise of that discretion.
Credit products are not underwritten based upon the likely ability of the
consumer to make the required (or, in the case of adjustable rate products,
potentially required) payments over the term of the loan.124

This list, which is quite consistent with the concerns expressed in the
Bar-Gill and Warren article discussed in Part II above, suggests that the
Bureau uses examination to uncover creation of products that exploit
consumers’ lack of understanding of costs and risks. The statute asks
whether consumers understand risks, costs, and conditions—as opposed to
requiring mere knowledge—and takes into account consumer appreciation
of risks, including the risk that the consumer will use a given feature.
Because Dodd-Frank explicitly bars the CFPB from imposing usury limits,
the implication is that other substantive regulation of credit products is
authorized, particularly under the agency’s anti-abuse power, to eliminate

123. EXAMINATION HANDBOOK 2011, supra note 4, at Risk Assessment 1–3.
124. Id. at Risk Assessment 2–3.

128

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 7

confusing intricacies that impair consumer understanding.125 The CFPB is
looking for pricing terms that are complex and changing and that include
features that research shows consumers do not pay attention to but which
come back to bite them.
Furthermore, the template asks whether a product or service is marketed
to particular populations, such as students or young adults, the elderly,
minorities, immigrants, military, those with limited education or English
proficiency, low-income consumers, consumers receiving public assistance,
or those who have recently experienced financial distress or who have low
credit scores.126 While some of these categories concern illegal
discrimination based on suspect categorizations such as race and age, a
number of the categories are indicative of vulnerability to exploitation. The
CFPB seems to be looking for abuse in the form of targeting those who may
have particular difficulty appreciating risks. Another section of the template
focuses on sales force incentives and calls for examination of both
compensation based on particular products sold without consideration of
outcomes, such as default rates, and marketing materials, such as
advertising that features teaser rates without important conditions or that
targets consumers not likely to benefit from a product.127 Once again, one
can see that the CFPB is searching for exploitation of lack of consumer
understanding of risks, costs, and conditions.
CONCLUSION
The CFPB’s early articulation of its UDAAP authority is exciting
because it represents a turn away from mere disclosure to more substantive
consumer protection and provides a model that states could follow. The
CFPB’s new power to regulate abusive acts and practices gives it the means
to target and eliminate consumer financial products that show signs of
having been designed to exploit consumer misunderstanding of costs and
risks. Furthermore, the CFPB’s examination handbook, particularly in its
risk assessment template, suggests that the agency is bringing to bear
lessons of behavioral economics in its search for patterns of consumer error
in the use of financial products. Of course, the CFPB’s success in curbing
abuses will depend on follow-through—particularly how hard it pushes
financial institutions to stop marketing exploitative products and its
willingness to use enforcement actions when subtler pressure does not
accomplish this mission. Prevention of consumer abuse will also require
125. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 1027(o), 124 Stat. at 1995 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5517(o))
(providing that the CFPB has no authority to set usury limits); see also supra note 22 and
accompanying text (concerning deregulation of interest rates for most consumer credit products
after a 1978 U.S. Supreme Court decision and the Dodd-Frank Act’s ban on CFPB reimposing
them).
126. Id. at Risk Assessment 3–4.
127. Id. at Risk Assessment 5–6.
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sticking with the project over time, even when the mania of a market bubble
threatens to grip us again.

